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Abstract:  Economists and financial analysts have begun to recognise the importance of the 
actions of other agents in the decision-making process. Herding is the deliberate mimicking of 
the decisions of other agents. Examples of mimicry range from the choice of restaurant, fash-
ion and financial market participants, to academic research. Herding may conjure negative 
images of irrational agents sheepishly following the actions of others, but such actions can be 
rational under asymmetric information and uncertainty. This paper uses futures position data 
in nine different markets of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to provide 
a direct test of herding behaviour, namely the extent to which small traders mimic the posi-
tions of large speculators. Evidence consistent with herding among small traders is found for 
the Canadian dollar, British pound, gold, S&P 500 and Nikkei 225 futures. Consistent with 
survey-based results on technical analysis, the positions are significantly correlated with both 
current and past market returns. Using various time-varying volatility models to accommodate 
conditional heteroskedasticity, the empirical results are found to be robust to alternative mod-
els and methods of estimation. When a test of causality-in-variance is used to analyse if vola-
tility among small traders spills over into spot markets, it is found that spillovers occur only 
with Nikkei 225 futures. The policy implications of the findings are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction. 
Herding, or the deliberate mimicking of the decisions of other agents after such decisions 
have been observed, is a widespread social phenomenon. Throughout the animal kingdom, 
herding is a natural instinct as it provides safety from predators. There is an increasing 
acceptance of the existence of herding among economic and financial agents. Asch (1952) 
provided experimental evidence to show that subjects consider the opinions of others in 
formulating their own decisions. Becker (1991) has argued that herding can occur in a variety 
of social situations, such as restaurant choice. Individuals often conform as they either have a 
preference to do so, or numbers reaffirm the decisions made by agents. Although herding 
tends to conjure images of lemmings mindlessly falling over a cliff, such a conception would 
be misguided, as herding can be rational at an individual level under appropriate conditions. 
The tendency of financial market participants to base their decisions on those of others, rather 
than on their private information, was apparent to Keynes (1936, p.157): “Investment based 
on genuine long-term expectations is so difficult … as to be scarcely practicable. He who 
attempts it must surely … run the greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the 
crowd how the crowd will behave.” 
Keynes proceeded to discuss his celebrated beauty contest example, whereby members of the 
public voted not for whom they thought was the prettiest, but whom other voters would find 
most appealing. It is important to bear in mind that herding is most likely to occur in 
situations where the decisions of others are observable, as it is not possible to copy what 
cannot be observed. Moreover, herding is likely to occur where decisions are taken 
sequentially so as to allow agents to observe the decisions of other agents. 
The Asian economic and financial crises spurred the growth in research of the tendency of 
financial market participants to display mob-like instincts. As foreign investors fled to safety, 
the mass exodus of capital may be likened to animal herds where, as soon as a few investors 
flee, the rest follow. de Brouwer (2001) has argued that large macro hedge funds were the 
leaders responsible for encouraging the herd to liquidate investments, as many market 
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participants believed that macro hedge funds possessed superior information and expertise. 
The prospect that a few large market participants could destabilise global capital markets has 
led many to argue for reforms to the international financial system in order to limit the 
impacts of such systemic risks. Consequently, testing for the presence of herding in financial 
markets is a highly topical issue in the international finance literature, especially as there have 
been few empirical papers related to the existence of herding. 
Many explanations for the existence of herding have been proposed, such as imperfect 
information and the nature of compensation in managerial contracts. Becker’s (1991) 
restaurant example shows that, when confronted with different choices and without private 
information, agents may base their decisions upon the number of patrons. This outcome may 
arise because previous patrons are believed to have made their decisions based upon private 
signals regarding quality. While many theoretical models have been proposed, a test of 
herding behaviour by economic agents is problematic. Part of this problem stems from an 
inability to observe directly the cognitive processes underlying the actions of agents. Various 
measures of herding have been devised to overcome these problems, but most empirical 
research has presented only indirect tests of the theoretical models proposed in the literature.  
This paper provides a direct test of herding behaviour among small futures traders, 
specifically whether the futures positions of large speculators affect small trader portfolios. 
While large speculators are often blamed for significant market fluctuations, with the 
empirical literature focusing almost exclusively on institutional herding, analysing small 
traders is important for a number of reasons. First, small traders often comprise a large 
segment of markets, and can destabilise markets by moving in herds. Second, de Brouwer 
(2001, pp. 64-66) shows that large players often seek to manipulate small traders, so that the 
reactions of small traders to large speculators is an important consideration in analysing the 
effects of large traders on market prices. Third, small traders may, as the models outlined 
below predict, exacerbate price movements in their trading patterns. The seemingly excessive 
volatility of financial markets relative to fundamentals has long been a topic of fascination 
among financial economists. Examining the behaviour of small traders also contributes to an 
understanding of market dynamics. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical results in 
the literature. Section 3 outlines a direct test for the existence of herding among small futures 
traders. The data to be used for testing the theory are analysed in Section 4, and the volatility 
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models and empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 presents some concluding 
comments. 
 
 
2. Literature Review. 
2.1. Theory. 
Herding is defined as a conscious decision by agents to mimic the actions of others. Thus, 
herding is a deliberate decision, which should not be confused with correlated decision 
making that is purely incidental. In the case of financial markets, investors have access to 
common information sets and may employ similar techniques in evaluating this information. 
Therefore, agents may behave in a similar manner, not through consciously following the 
actions of others, but through acting upon the same information. For example, noise traders, 
such as in the models of Kyle (1985) and De Long et al. (1990a), may employ similar 
technical trading strategies which result in significant correlations. However, this type of 
behaviour does not represent herding because the actions of other noise traders play no part in 
individual investment decisions. Consequently, the detection of herding can be difficult 
because, if group decisions are correlated, their decisions need to be decomposed into those 
components arising from information and from herding.  
In the presence of uncertainty, mimicking the decision of others may be perfectly rational, so 
that herding need not be associated with irrational behaviour. However, the herding 
equilibrium may not be socially efficient and prices may be more volatile than if agents had 
acted independently of each other. Invaluable surveys of the rational herding literature are 
given in Devenow and Welch (1996), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Brunnermeier 
(2001). Herding may arise for a variety of reasons. Managerial remuneration often depends 
upon reputation, but the principals may be uncertain of managerial quality. Thus, poor 
managers have an incentive to copy the decisions of other managers in order to mask their 
inferiority. The model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) is of this type, but lies outside the 
scope of the paper. Agents may also be compensated according to performance relative to 
their peers. In this instance, risk-averse managers will be unlikely to deviate from their peers, 
and will tend to cluster in their portfolio decisions. As shown in the models of Roll (1992) and 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), such contracts result in inefficient outcomes. Models of 
reputational herding lie outside the focus of this paper. 
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The type of herding most directly related to the context of futures market traders is based on 
the theory of information cascades, as in Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Welch 
(1992), and Avery and Zemsky (1998). An information cascade arises when decisions are 
made by each agent sequentially, but agents begin to ignore their private signals in favour of 
the observed actions of previous agents.
1
 These signals are generally either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
and, importantly, agents cannot observe the signals received by other agents.
2
 However, the 
probability of the good or bad signal can be inferred from the actions of others, which are 
assumed to be observable. As agents are unsure of the quality of the signals, the actions of 
others are used to update their beliefs about, for example, the true value of an asset. Using 
Bayes’ rule, given a sequence of decisions, if the suggested course of action implied by an 
agent’s private signal is in conflict with the decisions of others, the sheer weight of numbers 
may cause agents to discard their private information and use the decisions of others to herd.  
In the models cited above, the probability of a cascade beginning with the first few agents is 
high. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) show that herding is more likely, the less certain is an 
individual of the private signal. Moreover, if the signals received are noisy, and hence provide 
little certainty, the probability that the herd arrives at an incorrect decision (such as failing to 
invest when they should) will be high. This illustrates that herding can lead to inefficient 
social outcomes, despite the fact that agents have acted in a self-interested and rational 
manner. Thus, in situations where agents are prone to herd, the market mechanism cannot be 
used to reach a socially efficient outcome. 
Furthermore, the theoretical models illustrate that cascades are fragile. Cascades imply that 
prices reflect only a narrow information set, so the arrival of new information can lead agents 
to re-evaluate their choices and cause the cascade to shatter. This suggests that herds can 
quickly reverse their decisions, which has implications for the time series properties of futures 
market traders. If traders are in an information cascade, it follows that, with a constant supply 
of news to the market, relatively little persistence should be observed in their positions. New 
information will result in the cascade shattering and noise traders altering their positions. If 
the positions of traders are persistent, this would provide indirect evidence against the 
existence of information cascades. However, these models cannot be tested directly because 
neither the order of decisions nor the decision making process of agents can be observed. 
                                                          
1. Bikhchandani et al. (1998) provide a review of the theory underlying information cascades. 
2. The relevance of cascades has been questioned by, for example, Shiller (1995, p. 183). 
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The fragility of information cascades has important consequences for financial market 
stability. If the herd is prone to alter its positions, then herding will cause financial markets to 
be excessively volatile. Thus, if small trader positions are random, this may provide evidence 
that would support policies aimed at limiting the extent of noise trading. Furthermore, herding 
reduces the information content of prices. Those who trade after a cascade has started provide 
no information to subsequent traders because they are merely copying the actions of others. 
As prices do not impound all private information, prices can be socially inefficient.
3
 This also 
explains why cascades are fragile, as they are based on relatively little information. With the 
arrival of new information, agents may find these signals to be more informative and alter 
their decisions, so that the cascade shatters. 
A crucial assumption in the development of information cascade herding (ICH) models is 
whether prices are fixed or respond to supply and demand. Avery and Zemsky (1998) develop 
a model that allows prices to be flexible, in which case the situation faced by subsequent 
agents is not the same. If financial markets are competitive, then prices adjust to reflect all 
publicly available information, so that investors with only public information will be 
indifferent between buying or selling. If a trader is privately informed and trades, this 
information is revealed and impounded into prices. Consequently, an information cascade is 
prevented from forming, thereby making financial market prices informationally efficient. 
However, the model of Avery and Zemsky (1998) shows that if there are two types of traders, 
namely well informed and poorly informed, and the proportion of these traders in the market 
is not common knowledge, then herding can arise. If prices are flexible, uncertainty regarding 
investment values is insufficient to create herding incentives. Prices will not be efficient, even 
though agents have acted rationally.  
 
2.2. Empirical Literature. 
While the theoretical literature is well developed, the empirical literature has performed only 
indirect tests of the various herding theories, which stems from an inability to observe the 
                                                          
3. Froot et al. (1992) present another type of herding model. Based on pay-off externalities, 
they show why prices may not necessarily embody all relevant information. Traders are 
allowed to have short-term investment horizons so that, if a particular piece of information 
is unlikely to be reflected in prices in the short run, there will be no incentive for agents to 
acquire such information. Agents herd on only some information, which may not even 
relate to fundamentals. Therefore, prices are not informationally efficient in the sense that 
they reflect only a subset of the total available information. Such a model can help explain 
why prices may over-react to news. 
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reasons why agents make their decisions. Consequently, tests have been developed that are 
consistent with the existence of herding. However, as described below, the tests are typically 
necessary, but no sufficient, for herding. Therefore, it is not known to what extent agents 
accommodate the decisions of others in their decision making. A major limitation in any test 
of herding is the inability to separate intentional herding from coincidental decision making, 
in which agents may appear to make similar decisions through possessing similar information, 
while paying no attention to the actions of others. Such an observation would result in 
correlated decisions, but would not imply the existence of herding. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) developed a measure of herding among mutual fund managers.  
Their procedure tests whether the actual number of investors buying or selling a particular 
stock differs from the expected number of investors buying or selling if agents were to make 
their decisions independently. Although they concluded that money managers do not exhibit 
herding, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) noted that they had only analysed the correlation in 
trading patterns which, while consistent with herding, does not guarantee its existence. Using 
the test of Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999) found some evidence of herding in 
seasonally unadjusted quarterly data of mutual fund managers.  
According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000, p.18), a serious limitation of the method of 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) is that the method only considers the number of traders and pays 
little attention to the amount or value of the assets traded. As these studies also use quarterly 
data, this would make the detection of herding less likely as information received during this 
time interval is likely to swamp any information obtained from observing the positions of 
other funds managers. Moreover, the ability to observe the portfolios of other managers may 
be restricted due to reporting requirements, so that funds managers would find it difficult to 
determine the portfolio decisions of others in a timely manner. Tentative evidence for herding 
has also been found by Grinblatt et al. (1995), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Choe et al. (1999) 
and Chang et al. (2000). While some have found little indication of herding, those who have 
concluded that herding exists have typically only tested the correlation among traders. As 
discussed above, such evidence is insufficient to conclude that herding exists among financial 
market participants.  
Another approach to test for the presence of herding is that adopted by Christie and Huang 
(1995), and extended by Chang et al. (2000), who examine the presence of herding across a 
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variety of international equity markets. Christie and Huang (1995) define the cross-sectional 
standard deviation, defined as: 
 
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where Rm,t is the average of the N returns in the market portfolio at time t and Ri,t is the stock 
return of firm i at time t. This captures how stock returns are spread around the average return. 
Christie and Huang (1995) assert that traditional asset pricing theory predicts that the 
dispersion of returns increases with market returns due to different stock sensitivities to 
market returns. In periods of herding, stock returns will tend to cluster around the market 
returns. Chang et al. (2000) show that, under rational asset pricing models, the dispersion of 
stock returns is an increasing linear function of market returns.  
The CSSD measure given above is used in the following equation: 
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in which L
t
D  ( U
t
D ) takes the value 1 if the market return at time t is in the extreme lower 
(upper) tail of the distribution, and zero otherwise, with ‘extreme’ defined as being in the top 
or bottom one (or five) percent of the distribution of returns. The logic underlying such a 
specification is that traders are more likely to herd in times of heightened uncertainty and 
market turbulence, so that extreme market moves should result in stock returns being less 
dispersed around the market average. Chang et al. (2000) also estimate the model for periods 
when the market return is positive and when it is negative. While no evidence of herding was 
found to exist for the USA or Hong Kong, partial evidence was found for Japan, and evidence 
in favour of herding was found for South Korea and Taiwan. 
Other researchers have provided tests of reputational herding models by testing the extent to 
which investment newsletters and security analysts herd among each other. Graham (1999) 
reports that newsletters with high reputations are more likely to herd in their 
recommendations in order to protect reputation. Welch (2000) explores the importance of 
consensus among security analysts in determining their recommendations. The idea behind 
such tests is that analysts who differ from average are likely to be judged harshly if they are 
wrong. However, if all analysts are wrong, no analyst would be criticised as agents would 
infer that it was difficult to anticipate. Welch (2000) finds evidence that consensus influences 
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the revisions of analysts, as do the two most recent revisions. Such evidence suggests there is 
a tendency for investment analysts to herd. 
Kodres and Pritsker (1996) examine herding among large futures traders, where size is 
determined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Daily data were 
analysed for large positions on interest rate futures, S&P 500 composite index, British pound, 
Canadian dollar, Deutsche mark, Japanese yen and Swiss franc for the period August 1992 to 
August 1994. Large traders were disaggregated into numerous categories such as commercial 
banks, hedge funds and mutual funds. Correlation coefficients were calculated among the 
various trader types, and were found to be statistically significant in only 5 of 29 cases. A 
probit model was used to test the extent to which the probability of buying by one agent 
depended on the decisions of others. However, the analysis is still subject to the qualification 
that such alleged herding may be coincidental rather than genuine.   
Moreover, Kodres and Pritsker (1996) examined only whether sub-categories of large traders 
herd. As small traders were neglected, they overlooked a potentially important group of 
traders with incentives to herd. Small traders do not have the resources or expertise of large 
traders. As small traders may be acting on inferior information, they may not possess the 
skills to decipher information releases appropriately. Therefore, small traders have an 
incentive to view large traders for guidance as to the appropriate course of action. The 
assumption made by small traders is that large traders, acting upon superior information, 
disclose the signals received through their trading activities. Consequently, an examination of 
the tendency of small traders to herd, based on the activities of large traders, is an important 
and neglected area that is worth of serious empirical consideration. 
 
 
3. A Direct Test for Herding. 
Although the theoretical models presented above do not yield direct tests, they do provide 
guidance in constructing an appropriate empirical specification. Data for individual trades are 
not available according to the traders involved. The models of Kyle (1985), De Long et al. 
(1990a) and Shalen (1993) distinguish among traders based on the information at their 
disposal. Small traders are typically assumed to be naïve as they use past prices in making 
investment decisions, and are also presumed to form extrapolative expectations of future 
prices. This suggests a lag structure to accommodate the possibility that small traders use 
recent price changes to determine their futures positions. Including contemporaneous price 
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changes also accommodates fundamentals, as prices will respond to news concerning 
fundamentals in an efficient market. Small traders may also exhibit some reaction to 
fundamental news, so that contemporaneous prices are likely to be an important factor in 
explaining the futures positions of small traders. 
As described below, futures market position data are used to measure small traders and large 
speculators. Therefore, the empirical results are conditioned on total open interest in futures 
markets as futures activity may vary over time. Small traders may exhibit persistence in their 
positions as investments are typically undertaken with a general time horizon in mind. For 
this reason, the positions of small traders are likely to depend on their positions in previous 
periods. If previous small trader positions are important, and are correlated with other 
variables, the omission of previous small trader positions would bias the estimates and their 
standard errors.  
A primary motivation for this paper is to test for herding among futures market participants, 
namely small traders, which is measured by including the lagged positions of large futures 
speculators. Such large speculators are assumed to be informed traders because their size 
allows them to acquire high quality information. Moreover, there is an incentive for large 
speculators to invest considerable time and resources in evaluating the information at their 
disposal. As the actions of large speculators may provide an externality to small traders by 
revealing the implicit information and expectations of large traders, this provides a direct test 
of herding by small traders. The empirical model is dynamic and is estimated with a lag 
length of one, as weekly data are used and higher-order lags quickly become dated because 
news arrives continuously. With a constant supply of news, it is unlikely that herding would 
be observed using information based on two lags. 
The empirical specification is given by 
ttttttt
uspotretβspotretβOIβenetlβnetsmallββnetsmall 
 154312110
arg       (1)  
where netsmall is defined as the difference between long and short non-reportable positions, 
as compiled by the CFTC, netlarge represents large non-commercial trader series (or 
speculators), OI is the total open interest in the futures series, spotret is the log-difference of 
spot prices observed between time t and t-1, and ut is assumed to be an independent and 
identically distributed random shock with zero mean and unit variance. Equation (1) will be 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). The null hypothesis of herding is H0: 2  = 0. If 
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small traders herd according to large speculators, than net large speculators should have a 
positive impact on the positions of small traders, so that herding implies the alternative 
hypothesis, HA: 2  > 0. In order to test whether small traders form extrapolative expectations 
and investment decisions, as in De Long et al. (1990a), the null hypothesis is H0: 5  = 0. If 
small traders simply trade on the basis of trends in market prices, then HA: 5  > 0, which 
means their positions are changed in the same direction as past price changes. 
 
 
4. Data and Empirical Analysis. 
Specification (1) indicates that data are required on the positions of small traders, large 
speculators, open interest and spot market returns. The Commitments of Trader (CoT) reports 
compiled by the CFTC, which is the regulatory body of the US futures and options markets, 
are used to measure the prevalence of small traders, large hedgers and large speculators. 
Traders of sufficient size, as defined in the CFTC regulations, are required to declare their 
purpose in trading futures. If futures trading is conducted to mitigate or control risks for a 
commercial enterprise that relies on the underlying asset, such traders are classified as 
commercial traders, or ‘large hedgers’. Large traders who do not have an underlying business 
that relies upon the asset for commercial purposes are termed ‘non-commercial’ traders, or 
‘large speculators’. 
Traders deemed by the CFTC not to be of sufficient size to be classified as large are 
collectively reported as non-reportable positions, which we will call ‘small traders’. These 
small traders may use futures to hedge or speculate, but are not required to declare their 
interest in using futures because of their size. The literature has typically assumed such 
traders to be poorly informed relative to large traders, which appears reasonable as 
information and trading are costly in both time and resources. Therefore, small traders are less 
likely than large traders to have access to high quality information, and also less likely to be 
able to disseminate information released to the market. Small traders are, therefore, more 
likely than large traders to employ simple trading rules based on readily observable historical 
price movements. In this paper, it is assumed that small traders act as noise traders of the type 
described in Kyle (1985), Black (1986) and De Long et al. (1990a). As data on noise traders 
have become available only recently, the direct tests of herding behaviour proposed in this 
paper were not viable when these papers were published.  
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Small traders possess less information and have an incentive to consider the positions of bet-
ter informed large traders, and hence are prone to herding behaviour. Large traders not only 
use better information but will also have expended greater efforts in interpreting such inform-
ation. As trading positions reveal their decisions, small traders would be expected to benefit 
by examining the positions of large traders in formulating their own portfolios. Consequently, 
the use of data on small futures traders is a direct test of the existence of herding. Data on the 
position of large traders and non-reportable (or small trader) positions were compiled from 
the CFTC’s web-site (www.cftc.gov), which reports weekly positions. It will be recalled from 
Section 2 that many herding studies have used quarterly data, which is arguably not suffici-
ently frequent to be useful for tests of herding. Thus, weekly data are more likely to provide 
direct evidence of herding. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that participation in fu-
tures markets varies over time, so that including the total amount of futures market open inter-
est is likely to be important. The open interest data were obtained from Datastream. 
The impact of historical price movements was outlined above. In order to measure this 
impact, spot market data for all assets were downloaded from Datastream. The use of spot 
market data serves several useful purposes. As outlined in Bessembinder and Seguin (1992), 
the existence of futures markets has been argued to exert a destabilising influence on the 
underlying spot markets. This paper provides an interesting perspective on the effect of 
futures market participants on the underlying asset market. Furthermore, futures contracts 
expire periodically so that the construction of a continuous series requires certain assumptions 
as to the rolling over of futures contracts. The use of spot market data circumvents this issue. 
Finally, the use of spot rates instead of futures prices is not expected to affect significantly the 
results for the markets examined. As these are typically viewed as cash-and-carry markets, 
future supply conditions do not influence the spread between spot and futures markets (see 
Neftci (1996, p. 4)). 
Tables 1 to 9 report the summary statistics of the data series used in this paper. The sample is 
for the period 6 October 1992, when the CFTC began releasing weekly data, to 15 October 
2002, giving 521 weekly observations. On average, mean returns for each currency market 
imply that each currency depreciated against the USD, which displayed significant strength 
over this period. The S&P 500 index provided positive capital gains, on average, reflecting 
the high returns of US equities. In contrast, the Nikkei 225 lost value as the Japanese 
economy faltered, with deflation and the bursting of the asset price bubble. Consistent with 
previous studies, mean weekly returns appear to have a non-Gaussian distribution, with the 
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Lagrange Multiplier test of normality (LM(N)) rejecting the null hypothesis at the one percent 
level for all returns. Indeed, normality is rejected for most of the data. From the sample 
skewness and kurtosis statistics reported in Tables 1 to 9, it seems that returns have fatter tails 
than the normal distribution, which has been widely documented in financial time series. 
Conversely, the number of contracts data is most often thin-tailed, with kurtosis coefficients 
less than three. Moreover, it appears that the data are not highly skewed, so that normality is 
most likely rejected due to kurtosis that differs from the normal distribution. 
A noteworthy observation is that the mean number of futures contracts of large hedgers was 
negative, making them net sellers, for AUD, CAD, oil, gold, S&P 500 and Nikkei 225 futures 
contracts. This indicates that these commodities were produced by large hedgers who sought 
certainty in the price at which they could sell their products. For example, oil companies and 
gold miners could use futures to lock in the future price of their commodities, and fund mana-
gers could use S&P 500 and Nikkei 225 futures to lock in the value of their portfolios and to 
manage exposure to market risk. Table 9 shows that the mean values of large speculator and 
small trader contracts were positive. It follows that speculators lost money on the Japanese 
stock market as it depreciated, on average, yet speculators maintained long positions over this 
period. 
It is an interesting issue to examine what types of hedgers employ currency futures through 
the use of survey questionnaires. Australia runs a current account deficit, and so imports more 
than it exports, and large hedgers tend to be net sellers of AUD. If only exporters and 
importers used futures contracts for hedging, this would suggest that importers are more 
active participants in futures markets than are exporters. Conversely, the USA is a large 
importer from Japan, and large hedgers tend to be net buyers of Japanese yen. This is 
consistent with the direction of trade between the USA and Japan, as importers would be 
expected to outweigh exporters in hedging yen because of the nature of the current account 
deficit. Therefore, the relationship between a country’s trade position and the nature of those 
hedging its currency would be worth investigating to determine the reasons for which agents 
hedge currency risk, and on which side of the market they operate. 
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TABLE 1 – Summary Statistics for AUD. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  0.0005  957 -953  51.8  17768 
Median  0.0000  179.00  0.0000  0.0000  17586 
Std Dev  0.0130  4610  8992  4972  9957 
Skewness -0.026  1.305 -1.131  1.030  0.691 
Kurtosis  3.668  5.364  5.507  6.109  3.459 
LM(N)  9.742**  269.10**  247.54**  301.96**  46.084** 
ADF -15.870** -4.157** -5.043** -5.4896** -3.835** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – Summary Statistics for CAD. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root 
. 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  0.0005  6956 -4350 -2606  55155 
Median  0.0008  6457 -3641 -2461  55343 
Std Dev  0.0073  7596  19041  13523  16805 
Skewness  0.0490  0.162 -0.392  0.258 -0.089 
Kurtosis  4.063  2.610  3.168  3.346  2.147 
LM(N)  24.725**  5.570  13.967**  8.379*  16.481** 
ADF -15.974** -4.737** -5.702** -5.552** -4.404** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 3 – Summary Statistics for GBP. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean -0.0002  392  1041 -649  42612 
Median  0.0002  1156  3029 -1863  40719 
Std Dev  0.0116  7501  18800  12169  12283 
Skewness -0.386 -0.191 -0.186  0.240  0.467 
Kurtosis  5.139  1.933  2.470  3.479  2.742 
LM(N)  112.314**  27.869**  9.114*  10.001**  20.347** 
ADF -17.166** -6.4597** -7.532** -7.983** -7.073** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 – Summary Statistics for JPY. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  4.61E-05 -8183  20289 -12106  84698 
Median  0.0017 -10157  26485 -13179  80631 
Std Dev  0.0161  10733  29895  20805  22777 
Skewness -0.659  0.509 -0.449  0.293  0.879 
Kurtosis  5.948  2.516  2.468  2.791  3.872 
LM(N)  237.17**  25.66**  21.822**  7.111330*  72.031** 
ADF -15.518** -5.753** -5.769** -5.695** -6.361** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 5 – Summary Statistics for SFR. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  0.0003  2788  7921 -5133  49255 
Median  0.0006  3677  12304 -6857  47632 
Std Dev  0.0155  9211  23169  15034  12909 
Skewness -0.206 -0.465 -0.245  0.060  0.849 
Kurtosis  4.415  2.446  2.207  2.713  4.256 
LM(N)  47.110**  25.431**  18.854**  2.0946  96.861** 
ADF -16.895** -5.992** -6.410** -6.237** -6.708** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 –Summary Statistics for Oil. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  0.0007  764 -7088  400468  434186 
Median  0.0027  559 -7560  399888  425073 
Std Dev  0.0506  12557  39124  56915  67067 
Skewness -0.218  0.001 -0.080  0.261  0.735 
Kurtosis  4.491  3.098  2.660  2.942  3.562 
LM(N)  52.354**  0.2105  3.0596  5.9795  53.777** 
ADF -18.920** -5.170** 
 
-4.8072** 
 
-3.519** 
 
-3.712*! 
 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 7 –Summary Statistics for Gold. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean -0.0002  11063 -493 -105670  161254 
Median -0.0008  8448  4640 -13550  163643 
Std Dev  0.0169  11985  45742  35326  30947 
Skewness  1.649  0.673 -0.208  0.044 -0.332 
Kurtosis  16.781  2.599  2.122  2.229  2.695 
LM(N)  4359.07**  42.771**  20.488**  13.068**  11.567** 
ADF -17.376** -4.0950** -4.412** -4.560** -5.0520** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 –Summary Statistics for S&P 500. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean  0.0014  17839.8 -4076 -13763.8  426018.7 
Median  0.0035  6239  6486 -13772  404720 
Std Dev  0.0234  31538.8  37345  12435  64316 
Skewness -0.309  1.217 -0.938  0.144  1.238 
Kurtosis  6.407  3.450  2.959  3.366  4.399 
LM(N)  260.299**  132.914**  76.462**  4.722  175.649** 
ADF -17.428** -3.422*! -3.019! -3.787** -4.051** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. ! represents ADF with trend. 
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TABLE 9 – Summary Statistics for Nikkei 225. 
SMALL represents net small trader positions, SPEC is net large speculator positions, OI is 
futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market logarithmic returns, HEDGE 
represents net large hedger positions, LM(N) is the Lagrange Multiplier test of normality, and 
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of a unit root. 
 
Statistic SPOTRET SMALL HEDGE SPEC OI 
Mean -0.0013 1077.6 -2073.8 996.2 21361.9 
Median -0.0029 1247 -2513 1118 20050 
Std Dev 0.0338 1254.7 3177.3 2732.5 6312.1 
Skewness  0.480 -0.147  0.085  0.206  1.009 
Kurtosis  3.844  2.670  2.355  2.513  4.010 
LM(N) 35.470** 4.226 9.676** 8.833* 110.60** 
ADF -16.320** -5.198** -3.925*! -4.151**! -4.093** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. ! represents ADF with trend. 
 
 
The time series properties of each data set are analysed to enable the use of appropriate 
econometric techniques. ADF tests are used to establish whether a series displays non-
stationary behaviour, with the lag length selected according to the Schwarz information 
criterion. Deterministic trends were included for those series where it was deemed 
appropriate. For most series, the ADF test rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root which, 
given the low power of the test, is a strong result. The only series for which the null 
hypothesis was not rejected was large hedgers of S&P 500 futures contracts. Hence, the use of 
OLS appears to be justified, and transformation of the data is generally unnecessary. In order 
to accommodate possible non-stationarity, the data were also transformed to first differences 
to obtain stationarity, but with essentially the same quantitative outcomes. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
Although small traders may be unable to influence markets individually, they may comprise a 
sufficiently large segment of the market so as to make their collective behaviour influential. 
Figures 1 to 9 present the time series of the proportions of total open interest by each trader 
type. These figures illustrate that non-reportable, or small trader, positions can comprise a 
substantial proportion of future positions, and that their importance varies across both time 
and markets. Small traders comprise between 20 to 40 percent of most markets, with small 
traders being the least prevalent in the oil market (Figure 5), holding roughly ten percent of 
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contracts. The proportion of small traders in the market is the highest of the three trader types 
for GBP and SFR, and is relatively constant over time at around fifty percent. In general, 
these figures demonstrate that, as small traders comprise a significant proportion of futures 
positions, they could destabilise market prices if they were to move as a herd. 
In all other markets, large hedgers are the dominant trader type. With three trader types and 
total market open interest being observable, only two trader types need to be analysed as the 
third can be inferred. The correlation coefficients reported in Table 10 between small traders 
and large speculators, and between small traders and large hedgers, suggest that the trading 
behaviour of small traders most closely resembles that of large speculators. Interestingly, the 
correlation coefficients are larger in absolute value with hedgers than with speculators, but are 
negative. This suggests a very important function performed by noise traders in financial 
markets, namely as providers of liquidity, as outlined in Black (1986), which enables hedgers 
to manage risk.  
Except for GBP and SFR, large speculators and non-reportable, or small, positions are 
positively correlated. It is possible that small traders in GBP and SFR are primarily hedgers, 
which would explain the positive correlation. The positive correlations for the other markets 
suggest that small traders and large speculators share similar information. However, 
correlation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the existence of herding. If herding 
were to exist, the results in Table 10 suggest that it is most likely to be between small traders 
and large speculators.  
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TABLE 10 – CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SMALL AND LARGE TRADERS. 
Large 
Trader 
AUD CAD GBP JPY SFR Oil Gold SP500 Nikkei 
Speculator 0.797 0.594 -0.816 0.774 -0.816 0.240 0.827 0.313 0.155 
Hedger -0.910 -0.821 0.928 -0.898 0.927 -0.860 -0.901 -0.949 -0.528 
 
 
 
5. Volatility Models and Estimation. 
5.1. Herding Models. 
Table 11 provides tests of the hypothesis that small traders do not herd according to the 
positions of large traders, specifically in terms of the number of contracts of net small 
speculators. The estimates are obtained by OLS, with consistent Newey-West (1987) standard 
errors (using a truncation lag of five) in the presence of possible autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Given the insignificant t-ratios for one-period lagged net large speculators 
in 7 of 9 cases, the null hypothesis of no herding among small traders in future markets is 
generally not rejected. The theoretical models argue that agents may be prone to herding in 
the presence of better informed agents. In this context, it appears that small traders do not 
consider the previous positions of large speculators in trading futures contracts. The only 
markets for which the null hypothesis of no herding is rejected are S&P 500 and Nikkei 225 
at the one and five percent levels, respectively. Net small traders exhibit significant 
persistence, as indicated by lagged small traders, in the region of 0.81-0.96. Moreover, except 
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for S&P 500 and Nikkei 225, lagged net large speculators provide no incremental explanatory 
power of contracts held by net small traders over small traders in the previous period. 
All the coefficients for lagged small traders are positive and exceed 0.809, suggesting that 
small traders are positively autocorrelated. Thus, small traders do not trade erratically or 
randomly as their positions reflect a high degree of persistence. Another interesting 
implication of the results is how prices influence the positions of small traders. The results 
suggest that small traders employ extrapolative strategies, so that if the past value of the asset 
has increased (decreased), small traders will purchase (sell)  the asset. In interpreting the 
impact of exchange rate returns on small traders, the method used to quote exchange rates is 
that, exchange rates except for GBP, are quoted as foreign currency per unit of USD.   
Therefore, positive returns indicate that the foreign currency has depreciated, and negative 
returns indicate that the foreign currency has appreciated. Thus, the negative estimated 
coefficients indicate that, as a foreign currency appreciates (depreciates), small traders tend to 
buy (sell) foreign currency. Small traders also seem to destabilise oil prices, as indicated by 
the positive coefficient on lagged spot oil returns. As oil appreciates, small traders increase 
the amount of oil purchases, thereby adding impetus to price changes in the previous period 
and causing prices to overshoot the equilibrium level in the absence of such noise trading. 
This pattern of trading behaviour is consistent with expectations as to how small noise traders 
formulate their trading strategies. Being small, they do not have the resources to acquire 
costly information, and hence tend to rely on price movements to determine their investments. 
The coefficients of lagged spot returns were statistically significant in the currency and oil 
markets, suggesting that small traders may cause currency markets to be unstable. As small 
traders would add impetus to price movements in currency markets, prices would overshoot 
the equilibrium in a market without noise traders. Therefore, small traders seem to act in a 
manner that is consistent with theoretical models, such as in De Long et al. (1990a). 
While the ADF tests in Section 4 rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root for most series, 
small traders displayed a high degree of persistence, as indicated by the lagged coefficients in 
the region 0.81-0.96. Given the high persistence of small traders, the model was also 
estimated in first differences of net small traders, net large speculators and open interest in 
order to accommodate unit roots. The estimates are reported in Table 12, with the 
implications for herding differing between the two sets of estimates. Estimated using first 
differences, the data do not reject the null hypothesis of no herding for S&P and Nikkei, 
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unlike the results in Table 11, but reject no herding for CAD, GBP and gold futures at the one 
percent level. The positive and significant coefficients are consistent with small traders 
mimicking the previous positions of large speculators, indicating that small traders herd on 
the positions of large speculators for CAD, GBP and gold.  
The model estimated in first differences confirms the previous estimates that small traders 
change their positions in the same direction as price changes in the underlying asset. Lagged 
changes in small traders are insignificant for AUD, JPY, SFR, gold and S&P, which is con-
sistent with a high-degree of persistence in the small trader series for these commodities. For 
commodities with significant lagged changes in small trader positions, namely CAD, GBP, oil 
and Nikkei, the negative and significant coefficient estimates imply that, if the commodity has 
appreciated in the previous period, small traders will purchase the asset, on average.  
Significant results for both contemporaneous and lagged spot returns are reported for AUD, 
CAD, JPY, SFR and oil. Contemporaneous returns are significant for GBP, and lagged 
returns are significant for gold. Given the methods used to quote exchange rates, the signs of 
the coefficients are consistent with extrapolative trading strategies that would destabilise 
prices. The significance of contemporaneous returns may reflect reactions to fundamentals 
that result in price changes.  However, the significance of lagged returns is consistent  with 
markets being more volatile than in the absence of noise traders, who use strategies that fuel 
price changes and create short term price momentum. 
Diagnostic tests may suggest possible deficiencies in model specification and the robustness 
of the empirical results. The use of Newey-West standard errors provides consistent and valid 
inferences in the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. In most cases, the null 
hypotheses of no serial correlation and no ARCH effects are rejected by the Lagrange 
Multiplier tests, LM(SC) and  LM(ARCH), respectively. The interaction between these tests 
in unclear, but it is well known that ARCH effects can lead tests of serial correlation to over-
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Furthermore, if ARCH effects are present, 
the error terms are likely to be leptokurtic, and hence non-normal. 
 
TABLE 11. 
HERDING IN NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: OLS. 
OLS estimates of the number of contracts held by net small traders (NET SMALL). NET LARGE represents the number of net large speculation 
contracts, OI is total futures market open interest, and SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 521 observations, from 6 October 1992 
to 10 October 2002. LM(SC) is the LM test of serial correlation with up to 12 lags, LM(ARCH) is the LM test of ARCH effects with up to 12 lags, 
and the t-ratios are based on the Newey-West standard errors with a truncation lag of five. 
 
Market C NETSMALL(-1) NETLARGE(-1) OI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1) 2R  LM (SC) LM (ARCH) 
          
AUD -151.49 0.9351 -0.0175 0.016 -63482.7 -37224.2 0.926 15.98 35.90** 
 -1.66 42.11** -0.71 2.42* -9.39** -8.05**    
          
CAD -161.11 0.9034 -0.0025 0.0179 -237654 -96466.5 0.909 38.83** 10.31 
 -0.59 54.46** -0.31 2.96** -11.94** -5.77**    
          
GBP 178.036 0.8123 0.0215 -0.0036 232038 58941 0.855 419.5** 15.36 
 0.40 24.21** 1.18 -0.37 10.06** 4.92**    
          
JPY -777.23 0.8638 -0.0056 -0.0049 -170274 -57867.3 0.888 6.03 15.32 
 -1.39 37.40** -0.51 -0.80 -8.13** -5.26**    
          
SFR -202.85 0.8883 -0.0155 -0.0021 -181924 -56406. 0.907 427.8** 24.43* 
 -0.44 37.47** -1.12 -0.22 -10.92** -7.30**    
          
Oil -1574.76 0.8090 -0.0042 0.0077 51719.4 28110.8 0.765 21.17* 27.89** 
 -1.06 35.543** -0.36 0.74 8.47** 6.03**    
          
Gold 540.01 0.8897 0.0168 0.0056 156435 -415.83 0.903 17.52 64.53** 
 0.73 26.392** 1.72 1.09 4.98** -0.03    
          
S&P -2472.35 0.9629 0.0880 0.0104 19775.4 3091.1 0.971 18.85 35.56** 
 1.08 71.798** 3.70** 1.71 1.16 0.26    
          
Nikkei 161.90 0.8460 0.0229 -0.0008 721.06 -443.931 0.731 23.53* 75.34** 
 1.63 27.40** 2.23* -0.18 0.81 -0.42    
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
5.2. Volatility Models. 
In order to improve efficiency and the robustness of the empirical results, ARCH effects were 
modelled and incorporated in estimation. The GARCH(1,1), exponential GARCH(1,1) (or 
EGARCH(1,1), developed by Nelson (1990)), and GJR(1,1) (see Glosten et al. (1993)) 
processes are used to model the conditional variance of small traders. Engle (1982) proposed 
the univariate ARCH(p) process: 
ttt
h   
where 
t
  is the unconditional shock, ηt is an independently and identically distributed 
standardized (or conditional) shock with zero mean and unit variance, ht is the conditional 
variance of 
t
 , given by 
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and > 0, i ≥  0 (i = 1,…,p) are sufficient conditions to ensure that the conditional variance 
is non-negative for all t. The i (or ARCH) parameter contributes to the short run persistence 
of shocks,  
p
i i1
 . It is standard practice to assume that t is normally distributed, in which 
case maximizing the likelihood function yields the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). If 
t is not normal, the estimation method leads to the quasi-MLE (QMLE). 
Bollerslev (1986) extended ARCH(p) to the generalized ARCH model, GARCH(p,q), by 
specifying the conditional variance as 
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in which ω > 0, αi ≥  0 (i = 1,…,p) and βj ≥  0 (j = 1,…q) are sufficient for ht > 0 for all t. As 
for ARCH(p), the αi (or ARCH) parameter contributes to the short run persistence of shocks, 
 
p
i i1
 , while the βj (or GARCH) parameter is the contribution to long run persistence, 
  
q
j j
p
i i 11
 . The GARCH process gives a parsimonious representation of the dynamic 
structure of the conditional variance and has been applied to a wide array of financial data, as 
surveyed in, for example, Bollerslev et al. (1992), Bollerslev et al. (1994), Li et al. (2002), 
McAleer (2005), and Caporin and McAleer (2012). 
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In practice, the GARCH(1,1) model has provided an adequate representation of many 
financial series, as indicated by the standardized shocks displaying no significant ARCH 
effects. However, stock returns series have been shown to exhibit significant asymmetric 
effects, in that the sign of the lagged unconditional shock can affect the conditional variance 
significantly. A popular parsimonious representation of asymmetric conditional volatility is 
the EGARCH(1,1) model of Nelson (1990), namely 
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As EGARCH is specified in terms of the logarithm of the conditional variance, ht is 
guaranteed to be positive without imposing any parameter restrictions. Nelson (1990) proved 
that 1  ensures stationarity and ergodicity for EGARCH(1,1). Shephard (1996) postulates 
that 1  is likely to be sufficient for consistency of the QMLE for EGARCH(1,1). 
McAleer et al. (2007) argue that 1  is also a sufficient condition for the existence of 
moments. The only obvious limitation of the EGARCH model is the absence of asymptotic 
properties for the QMLE. 
The GJR(1,1) model of Glosten et al. (1993) also captures possible asymmetries in the 
response of conditional  volatility to past unconditional shocks, and is given as 
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where > 0,  ≥  0 and  ≥  0 are sufficient conditions for ht > 0, and I(t) is an indicator 
variable defined by: 
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which allows the sign of past shocks to have a different impact on volatility, as measured by 
. Furthermore,  affects both the short run and long run persistence of shocks,  
2

   and 
2

  , respectively. The GJR model may be preferable to EGARCH in that the structural 
and statistical properties have been established.  
Tables 13-15 present the QMLE of the coefficients of the conditional mean and conditional 
variance of the GARCH(1,1), GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) volatility models, respectively, in 
the absence of normality of the conditional shocks, t. The Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) ro- 
TABLE 12.  HERDING IN FIRST DIFFERENCE OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: IID. 
 
OLS estimates of the first difference of the number of contracts held by net small traders (dNET SMALL). dNETLARGE represents the first 
difference in the number of net large speculation contracts, dOI is the first difference of total futures market open interest, and SPOTRET denotes 
spot market returns. The sample is 520 observations from 6 October 1992 to 10 October 2002. LM(SC) is the LM test of serial correlation with up 
to 12 lags, LM(ARCH) is the LM test of ARCH effects with up to 12 lags, and the t-ratios are based on the Newey-West standard errors with a 
truncation lag of five. 
 
Market C dNETSMALL 
(-1) 
dNETLARGE 
(-1) 
dOI SPOTRET SPOTRET (-1) 2R  LM (SC) LM (ARCH) 
          
AUD 71.26 -0.0831 0.0489 0.0469 -62628 -34037 0.346 9.95 35.74** 
 1.30 -1.77 1.52 1.73 -9.06** -6.49**    
          
CAD 196.02 -0.2247 0.1177 0.0133 -239844 -81392 0.393 24.26* 6.47 
 2.32* -5.45** 4.72** 0.55 -11.53** -3.97**    
          
GBP 90.17 -0.1570 0.0932 0.0001 234194 32394 0.458 18.54 6.91 
 0.70 -2.88** 4.27** 0.004 9.54** 1.49    
          
JPY -40.03 -0.0394 0.0165 -0.0270 -163573 -294362 0.337 6.47 9.64 
 -0.24 -0.77 0.65 -1.90 -7.38** -2.01*    
          
SFR 69.86 -0.0854 0.0527 -0.0224 -180316 -34565 0.469 11.94 15.92 
 0.49 -1.75 1.72 -0.94 -10.10** -3.01**    
          
Oil 3.16 -0.1560 -0.0122 -0.0110 50860 27384 0.197 18.75 26.42** 
 0.01 -4.18** -0.87 -0.76 7.84** 5.51**    
          
 
         
Gold 104.2 -0.0995 0.0500 0.0040 -15530 159288 0.341 30.44** 45.52** 
 0.78 -1.80 2.62** 0.47 -1.17 5.01**    
          
S&P 56.57 -0.0729 0.0884 0.0434 22486 4116 0.062 31.84** 41.91** 
 0.27 -1.24 1.54 4.43** 1.36 0.36    
          
Nikkei 3.25 -0.2410 -0.0161 0.0295 766.9 -305.4 0.087 18.99 65.03** 
 0.14 -2.69** -0.41 2.16* 0.94 -0.30    
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 13. HERDING IN NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: GARCH(1,1) 
 
QMLE for the GARCH(1,1) model of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (NETSML). NET LRGE represents the number of net 
large speculation contracts, OI is total futures market open interest, and SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 521 observations from 6 
October 1992 to 10 October 2002.  
Market C NETSML(-1) NETLRGE(-1) OI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1) ω α β 
          
AUD -43.79 0.8887 0.0156 0.0127 -48394 -28528 5899 0.0326 0.9685 
 -0.61 32.61** 0.70 2.41* -16.21** -8.31** 2.51* 4.58** 144.54** 
          
CAD -68.58 0.9064 -0.0035 0.0165 -244373 -97977 7254184 0.0941 -0.5364 
 -0.18 46.99** -0.32 2.05* -19.45** -7.77** 4.96** 1.88 -2.03* 
          
GBP -173.40 0.8262 -0.0174 0.0050 -258414 -72877 1684637 0.1201 0.6567 
 -0.40 29.69** -1.02 0.53 -30.93** -5.40** 2.98** 2.90** 6.92** 
          
JPY -817.83 0.8722 -0.0094 -0.0044 -171740 -59833 3861820 0.0370 0.6539 
 -1.45 38.67** -0.88 -0.65 -24.85** -5.29** 0.88 1.14 1.76 
          
SFR 338.97 0.9002 0.0207 -0.0013 176816 56853 1043020 0.0870 0.7848 
 0.73 37.26** 1.62 -0.15 25.81** 6.01** 2.68** 2.99** 12.11** 
          
Oil -3453.06 0.8251 -0.0053 0.0131 51581 29063 18900020 0.0086 0.3438 
 -1.78 35.65** -0.44 1.26 11.47** 5.74** 4.56** 0.29 2.54** 
          
Gold 583.03 0.9020 0.0116 0.0041 175504 20708 6101450 0.1306 0.3289 
 0.79 40.56** 1.44 0.82 38.45** 1.65 3.24** 3.79** 1.84 
          
S&P 219.16 0.9758 0.0549 0.0020 16113 5280 18278519 0.3519 0.0697 
 0.12 86.75** 3.00** 0.44 2.15 0.50 6.28** 5.11** 0.71 
          
Nikkei -151.56 0.9192 0.0166 0.0119 2049 329.51 197648 0.4810 0.1482 
 -1.78 45.57** 1.82 3.95** 3.85** 0.43 10.52** 5.18** 2.90* 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 14. HERDING IN NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: GJR(1,1) 
QMLE for the GJR(1,1) model of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (NETSML). NET LRGE represents the number of net large 
speculation contracts, OI is total futures market open interest, and SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 521 observations from 6 
October 1992 to 10 October 2002.  
Market C NETSML(-
1) 
NETLRGE(-1) OI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1)  α β 
           
AUD 22.38 0.9284 -0.0093 0.0078 -56421 -33768 899274 0.4038 0.3265 -0.4216 
 0.14 40.73** -0.53 1.11 -13.17** -6.89** 6.85 2.53* 3.69** -2.66** 
           
CAD 32.11 0.9097 -0.0044 0.0150 -244160 -96456 2969775 0.0750 0.3963 -0.1167 
 0.08 43.89** -0.39 1.86 -20.25** -7.49** 1.35 1.39 0.90 -1.89 
           
GBP -132.71 0.8131 -0.0246 0.0027 -264530 -78981 1262296 0.0339 0.7288 0.1340 
 -0.31 30.91** -1.49 0.29 -31.17** -6.02** 3.45** 1.27 11.49** 2.34* 
           
JPY -800.10 0.8717 -0.0090 -0.0047 -172982 -60491 3117166 0.0148 0.7177 0.0371 
 -1.43 37.88** -0.85 -0.70 -25.17** -5.36** 0.90 0.54 2.38* 0.67 
           
SFR 301.98 0.8976 0.0188 -0.0011 178886 57257 2126071 0.0922 0.6133 0.0670 
 0.67 36.76** 1.49 -0.13 27.78** 5.88** 2.48* 2.52* 4.71** 1.08 
           
Oil -3417.3 0.8227 -0.0064 0.0141 51606 29019 18900018 -0.0057 0.3423 0.0306 
 -1.76 35.33** -0.53 1.35 11.46** 5.75** 4.50** -0.14 2.52** 0.57 
           
Gold 378.23 0.9055 0.0107 0.0050 176360 20745 5732612 0.0551 0.3876 0.0912 
 0.50 41.18 1.36 1.00 38.67 1.71 2.69 0.90 1.92 1.35 
           
S&P 543.34 0.9739 0.0535 0.0015 15039 5012 18278400 0.4986 0.0653 -0.2490 
 0.30 85.26** 2.92** 0.32 2.02* 0.49 6.58** 4.27** 0.76 -1.85 
           
Nikkei -193.24 0.9215 0.0177 0.0128 2089 419.6 193171 0.3027 0.1438 0.4220 
 -2.21* 44.32** 1.97* 3.94** 3.83** 0.55 10.13** 3.15** 2.78** 2.17* 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 15. HERDING IN NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: EGARCH(1,1) 
 
QMLE for the EGARCH(1,1) model of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (NETSML). NET LRGE represents the number of net 
large speculation contracts, OI is total futures market open interest, SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 521 observations from 6 
October 1992 to 10 October 2002.  
Market C NETSML(-1) NETLRGE(-1) OI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1)    
           
AUD 87.32 0.8982 0.0169 0.0156 -49918 -29327 0.024 0.1029 -0.0233 0.9932 
 -1.26 36.75** 0.76 3.01** -16.71** -8.66** 0.44 3.88** -1.22 260.04** 
           
CAD 119.7 0.9115 -0.0061 0.0131 -240582 -97978.3 8.873 0.0090 0.1227 0.4245 
 0.30 43.79** -0.55 1.62 -19.63** -7.635** 1.77 0.13 2.19* 1.31 
           
GBP -21.30 0.8216 -0.0214 0.0004 -254507 -72385 2.094 0.2007 -0.0827 0.8575 
 -0.05 28.81** -1.19 0.04 -29.71** -5.431** 2.85** 3.50** -2.27* 18.09** 
           
JPY -849.5 0.8825 -0.0128 -0.0035 -176299 -58401 18.79 0.1888 -0.0553 -0.1592 
 -1.53 38.95** -1.18 -0.52 -21.97** -5.184** 2.91** 2.21* -1.02 -0.40 
           
SFR 403.1 0.9097 0.0289 -0.0016 180833 56061 0.796 0.1359 0.0214 0.9434 
 0.84 38.79** 2.35* -0.17 25.11** 6.194** 1.75 2.58** 1.05 31.64** 
           
Oil -3147.1 0.8190 -0.0080 0.0140 51649 29087 2.559 0.0541 -0.0329 0.8484 
 -1.72 36.32** -0.65 1.44 11.32** 5.982** 1.38 0.92 -1.01 7.79** 
           
Gold 221.6 0.9146 0.0086 0.0051 162198 1135 3.451 0.2510 -0.0257 0.7760 
 0.31 44.38** 1.18 1.01 37.37** 0.1024 2.19* 4.51** -0.61 7.89** 
           
S&P -2005.2 0.9541 0.0362 0.0075 19011 5436 0.595 -0.0741 0.1224 0.9685 
 -2.43* 85.35** 3.63** 3.80** 2.35* 0.6014 17.74** -3.79** 5.87** 532.57** 
           
Nikkei -142.3 0.9234 0.0156 0.0105 2309 1.538 6.043 0.6985 -0.1143 0.4898 
 -1.82 49.87** 2.02* 3.61** 4.48** 0.002 8.44** 8.25** -1.83 8.55** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 16. HERDING IN FIRST DIFFERENCE OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: GARCH(1,1) 
 
QMLE for the GARCH(1,1) model of the first difference of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (dNETSML). dNETLRGE 
represents the first difference of the number of net large speculation contracts, dOI is the first difference of total futures market open interest, and 
SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 520 observations from 6 October 1992 to 10 October 2002. 
Market C dNETSML(-1) dNETLRGE(-1) dOI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1) ω α β 
          
AUD 78.21 -0.1136 0.0677 0.0411 -47978 -27084 7470 0.0370 0.9630 
 1.86 -2.26* 1.61 3.73** -16.45** -6.72** 2.26* 4.86** 130.00** 
          
CAD 195.82 -0.2266 0.1169 0.0130 -239030 -82053 3049360 -0.0080 0.4263 
 1.80 -4.40** 4.00** 1.34 -19.40** -4.94** 0.28 -0.3124 0.2049 
          
GBP 17.46 -0.1682 0.0853 -0.0025 261780 48176 784519 0.0292 0.8727 
 0.14 -2.96** 2.50** -0.17 28.61** 2.54** 3.80** 1.97* 29.68** 
          
JPY -44.36 -0.0363 0.0150 -0.0265 -163712 -30106 5609848 0.0096 0.6048 
 -0.2589 -0.70 0.56 -2.24* -22.25** -2.06* 0.32 0.29 0.49 
          
SFR 87.84 -0.0651 0.0597 -0.0266 -169763 -29319 654479 0.0457 0.8834 
 0.63 -1.18 1.85 -2.03* -24.42** -2.15* 1.48 1.94 12.92** 
          
Oil 57.23 -0.1632 -0.0089 -0.0155 50879 27828 19949483 -0.0302 0.3779 
 0.22 -3.37** -0.54 -1.30 11.17** 5.24** 1.82 -1.47 1.08 
          
Gold 69.39 -0.1121 0.0439 -0.0019 2475 161713 12364769 0.1750 -0.1219 
 0.44 -1.96 2.27* -0.21 0.17 36.55** 7.20** 4.59** -0.91 
          
S&P 26.84 -0.1508 0.0806 0.0297 27667 7233 138205 0.0398 0.9607 
 0.17 -3.69** 1.96 5.96** 3.83** 0.78 3.02** 3.62** 98.32** 
          
Nikkei 11.69 -0.1028 0.0038 0.0301 1157 250.5 207410 0.2796 0.2409 
 0.44 -1.74 0.15 8.80** 1.54 0.30 9.25** 4.25** 3.16** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 17. HERDING IN FIRST DIFFERENCE OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: GJR(1,1) 
 
QMLE for the GJR(1,1) model of the first difference of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (dNETSML). dNETLRGE represents the 
first difference of the number of net large speculation contracts, dOI is the first difference of total futures market open interest, and SPOTRET denotes 
spot market returns. The sample is 520 observations from 6 October 1992 to 10 October 2002. 
Market C dNETSML(-1) dNETLRGE(-1) dOI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1)   β 
           
AUD 59.60 -0.1120 0.0728 0.0407 -48998 -26708 5827 0.0130 0.9675 0.0449 
 1.34 -2.38* 1.78 3.34** -17.51** -6.84** 1.94 1.26 143.5** 2.43* 
           
CAD 214.35 -0.2209 0.1085 0.0134 -241246 -84172 3396942 0.0187 0.3630 -0.0569 
 1.95 -4.34** 3.80** 1.37 -19.96** -5.19** 0.67 0.45 0.38 -1.03 
           
GBP 39.36 -0.1721 0.0867 -0.0077 263338 51593 901724 0.0591 0.8484 -0.0386 
 0.31** -2.97** 2.54** -0.51 28.05** 2.66** 3.55** 2.24* 22.59** -1.42 
           
JPY -39.88 -0.0369 0.0140 -0.0263 -164062 -30630 8836424 0.0082 0.3785 0.0111 
 -0.23 -0.71 0.52 -2.22* -21.66** -2.04* 0.40 0.22 0.24 0.16 
           
SFR 109.54 -0.0683 0.0584 -0.0310 -167445 -31334 681394 0.0792 0.8782 -0.0604 
 0.75 -1.25 1.83 -2.37** -22.97** -2.43** 1.60 2.47** 13.67** -1.85 
           
Oil 58.18 -0.1622 -0.0079 -0.0150 51049 27833 19949477 -0.0474 0.3867 0.0175 
 0.22 -3.40** -0.48 -1.26 11.19** 5.20** 1.86 -1.01 1.14 0.35 
           
Gold 15.54 -0.0906 0.0460 0.0037 1486 168283 7528636 -0.0018 0.3154 0.2079 
 0.09 -1.75 2.37* 0.40 0.09 38.22** 3.41** -0.06 1.70 3.56** 
           
S&P 81.93 -0.1579 0.0876 0.0280 26056 6653 125058 0.0503 0.9648 -0.0273 
 0.49 -3.95** 2.10* 5.56** 3.37** 0.71 3.01** 2.75** 101.5** -1.11 
           
Nikkei -4.14 -0.1262 -0.0046 0.0305 1385 450 203738 0.1270 0.2359 0.3751 
 -0.15 -1.99* -0.18 8.94 1.94 0.58 8.74 2.06* 3.12** 2.51* 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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TABLE 18. HERDING IN FIRST DIFFERENCE OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTS OF NET SMALL TRADERS: EGARCH(1,1) 
 
QMLE for the EGARCH(1,1) model of the first difference of the number of contracts held by net small speculators (dNETSML). dNETLRGE 
represents the first difference of the number of net large speculation contracts, dOI is the first difference of total futures market open interest, and 
SPOTRET denotes spot market returns. The sample is 520 observations from 6 October 1992 to 10 October 2002. 
Market C dNETSML(-1) dNETLRGE(-1) dOI SPOTRET SPOTRET(-1)    
           
AUD 37.99 -0.1154 0.0541 0.0350 -58297 -32200 -0.0035 0.0661 -0.0258 0.9971 
 0.82 -2.45* 1.29 2.90** -19.24** -8.62** -0.08 4.13** -1.70 366.48** 
           
CAD 206.67 -0.2198 0.1113 0.0112 -239049 -82304 6.21 -0.0958 0.0397 0.6035 
 1.91 -4.72** 3.96** 1.13 -19.76** -5.41** 1.13 -1.22 0.71 1.70 
           
GBP 38.52 -0.1567 0.0883 0.0010 243378 37260 0.3922 0.0087 0.0112 0.9748 
 0.30 -3.25** 2.79** 0.07 27.61** 2.06* 5.11** 0.39 0.8337 223.24** 
           
JPY -18.78 -0.0327 0.0062 -0.0252 -165437 -32001 19.54 0.0937 -0.0789 -0.1897 
 -0.11 -0.63 0.23 -2.15* -21.30** -2.06* 1.99* 0.99 -1.37 -0.32 
           
SFR 69.09 -0.0801 0.0503 -0.0209 -180852 -33481 21.52 0.0186 -0.0419 -0.3447 
 0.49 -1.55 1.64 -1.59 -29.11** -2.55* 2.03* 0.25 -0.81 -0.52 
           
Oil 154.37 -0.1583 -0.0073 -0.0231 49746 2840 11.86 -0.1908 0.1787 0.3193 
 0.60 -4.14** -0.47 -1.96 11.16** 5.65** 3.28** -2.06* 3.46** 1.53 
           
Gold 44.18 -0.0842 0.0503 0.0028 -8789 159578 2.82 0.2519 -0.0792 0.8164 
 0.28 -1.61 2.68** 0.34 -0.60 36.00* 2.92** 4.48** -2.03* 13.55** 
           
S&P 210.07 -0.1594 0.0754 0.0295 23114 4203 0.0150 0.1164 0.0276 0.9945 
 1.33 -3.92** 1.94 5.88** 2.90** 0.46 0.25 4.49** 1.00 313.49** 
           
Nikkei -4.16 -0.1421 -0.0036 0.0274 1605 392 4.81 0.4324 -0.1513 0.6023 
 -0.16 -2.47* -0.15 9.00** 2.41* 0.51 5.89** 6.71** -2.77** 9.25** 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
bust standard errors are also presented in the absence of normality. EViews 3.0 was used to 
obtain the QMLE, and the Marquardt algorithm was employed to maximise the likelihood 
function, with the estimates converging in all cases. The QMLE are largely consistent with 
the OLS estimates. In the case of GARCH(1,1,), GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1), the null hypo-
thesis of no herding is rejected for S&P. There is a marginal rejection of no herding for Nik-
kei for GARCH(1,1), but the null hypothesis is rejected using GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1), 
suggesting that small traders in Nikkei futures contracts exhibit asymmetric responses. 
EGARCH(1,1) also shows there is evidence against the null hypothesis of no herding for 
SFR. 
The GARCH(1,1), GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) models were also estimated in first 
differences, for which the estimates are reported in Tables 16-18, respectively. These results 
are broadly similar to those presented in Table 12, as the null hypothesis of no herding is still 
rejected for the CAD, GBP and gold markets by all three models. Furthermore, the null 
hypothesis is also rejected for S&P using GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1), and is marginally 
rejected by EGARCH(1,1). Generally, these models support the contention that net small 
traders (or speculators) display herding tendencies, as indicated by the statistically significant 
one-period lagged positions of net large speculators.  
It will be recalled from Tables 11 and 12 that the ARCH(LM) test rejected the null hypothesis 
of no ARCH effects for small traders in AUD and non-currencies, but SFR displayed ARCH 
effects when estimated in levels. The significance of the conditional volatility estimates is 
generally consistent with these results. In virtually all of the models of AUD and non-
currency commodities, small traders have significant conditional volatility. Despite the null 
hypothesis not being rejected by LM(ARCH), the GBP small trader model displays 
conditionally heteroskedastic effects. 
The model for SFR, for which there was some evidence against no ARCH effects in Tables 
11 and 12,  seems to display  statistically  significant  ARCH  effects in most  specifications in  
Tables 13-17. In levels, Tables 14 and 15 indicate that asymmetry in volatility exists for 
AUD, CAD, GBP S&P and Nikkei. When the model is estimated in first differences, Tables 
17 and 18 show that the conditional variance of small traders is asymmetric for AUD, oil, 
gold and Nikkei, with marginal evidence of asymmetry for SFR small traders.  
The existence of asymmetry provides insights into how small traders trade. When small 
traders sell more than expected, there is an increase in the conditional variance of small 
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traders. If small traders sell when markets are falling, they may be more uncertain about their 
decisions, thereby leading to increased volatility. As small traders comprise a large segment 
of the market, such a finding has consequences for futures market regulations, and raises 
issues as to how small traders behave in falling, as opposed to rising, markets. Size limits and 
price restrictions in falling markets may be justified if the uncertainty of small traders is 
increased, thereby creating greater volatility in market prices. 
 
5.3. Impacts on Volatility. 
The empirical results provide evidence of herding among small trader positions in some 
markets. However, the existence of herding does not necessarily imply that such behaviour is 
destabilising. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) have argued that herding among institutions may 
result in prices moving toward equilibrium faster than without herding. Whether or not small 
traders have an impact on market volatility is highly significant for policymakers and market 
regulators. If it can be shown that small traders affect price volatility adversely, measures that 
may dampen their influence upon prices should be investigated. Conversely, if small traders 
do not affect market volatility, in spite of herding, they should not be the target of policy that 
is designed to influence their impact on price variability. While some may argue that the 
existence of arbitrageurs and fundamentals-based traders will prevent noise traders from 
pushing asset prices away from fundamental values for prolonged periods, theoretical models, 
such as De Long et al. (1990b), show that the existence of noise traders creates noise or small 
trader risk that may prevent rational traders from eliminating subsequent price discrepancies. 
In order to test the impact of small traders on price volatility, Hong’s (2001) unidirectional 
test of causality-in-variance is conducted. The test statistic, which is asymptotically distribut-
ed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no causality, is based on two conditionally hetero-
skedastic series, possibly with infinite unconditional variance, and examines whether the 
conditional variance of one series spills over into the other. As many of the small trader series 
exhibit conditionally heteroskedastic errors, this test is likely to provide insight into how 
small traders affect market volatility. If the volatility of small trader positions changes over 
time, this could reflect differing degrees of uncertainty or information releases. Moreover, if 
the volatility of small traders spills over into price variability, this would provide evidence 
that small traders destabilise markets. 
The statistic tests whether the estimated correlation coefficient,
uv
ˆ , between two standardized 
residuals, u and v, is significantly different from zero, and is given by 
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Hong (2001) allows the test procedure to attribute different weights to each lag through a 
weighting function, k(.), which increases the power of the test and recognises that past 
information is less important than more recent information. Two weighting kernels are used, 
namely Bartlett and Daniell, which are defined, respectively, as 
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 z-     ,/)sin()( zzzk  . 
For these kernels, all T-1 lags are included, but with declining weights. 
 
 
TABLE 19. 
HONG TEST OF CAUSALITY IN VARIANCE FROM SMALL TRADERS TO 
SPOT RETURNS (Daniell kernel) 
 
Market M=2 M=5 M=10 M=20 
     
AUD -0.706 -0.179 -0.122 -0.420 
     
CAD 1.009 0.405 1.488 1.427 
     
GBP -0.538 0.555 0.337 -1.128 
     
JPY -0.702 -0.296 1.510 -0.133 
     
SFR -0.682 -0.719 -1.073 1.331 
     
Oil  -0.636 -0.676 -0.828 -0.029 
     
Gold -0.707 -0.740 -1.180 -1.695 
     
S&P 0.507 0.026 -0.519 -0.884 
     
Nikkei -0.650 -0.216 3.045** 2.128* 
** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. Critical values are obtained from the upper 
tail of the N(0,1) distribution. 
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The results for the Hong test using the Daniell kernel, for which M was chosen as 2, 5, 10 and 
20, are given in Table 19.
4
  Spot returns were estimated using the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model, 
while the conditional mean for small traders is given in equation (1) with GARCH(1,1) errors. 
The results in Table 19, which are robust to the choice of weighting kernel, suggest that the 
conditional volatility displayed by small traders does not significantly affect the conditional 
volatility in spot returns, with the exception of Nikkei when M is high. A possible explanation 
for the significance of the test statistic for higher-order lags is outlined in Hong (2001). 
Specifically, longer lags provide greater power of the test where each lagged correlation 
coefficient is only marginally significant, but where the lags are jointly significant. For this 
reason, it does not seem that small traders destabilise spot prices, in general, despite the 
tendency for herding in some markets. 
 
 
6. Conclusion. 
Using data on the positions of futures traders across nine different financial commodities, the 
empirical results suggest the presence of herding behaviour among small traders across some 
markets. These results were found to be robust to asymmetric time-varying conditional vola-
tility effects in the model of small traders. The currencies, commodities and indices analysed 
are well developed markets with a high degree of transparency. According to Bikhchandani et 
al. (1992), herding is more likely to occur when agents are less confident of their own 
information, which is more likely be found in less-developed markets. Thus, an analysis of 
emerging markets, data permitting, would provide an interesting avenue for future research.
5
  
Furthermore, given the extent to which macro hedge funds have been blamed for the Asian 
economic and financial crises (see de Brouwer (2001)), it would be interesting to examine 
whether potential sub-categories of large speculators, such as hedge funds and proprietary 
trading desks, exert an influence on other market participants, such as small traders. de 
Brouwer (2001, p. 165) notes that many large hedge funds realize that small traders react to 
the trades of hedge funds, and use this information. Decomposing large speculators into hedge 
                                                          
4. The Bartlett kernel results led to quantitatively similar results, and are available from the 
authors on request. 
5. Recall that Chang et al. (2000) found evidence of herding in South Korea and Taiwan, 
where herding was measured as changes in the average dispersion of stocks around market 
returns in periods of market calm versus extreme conditions. No data on small traders were 
used. 
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funds, which are often viewed as market leaders, and testing the extent to which they 
influence small traders, is also a fruitful avenue for future research. 
There are far-reaching economic implications of the existence of herding. The possibility of 
herding can lead to multiple equilibria, causing asset prices to deviate for prolonged periods 
from fundamentals, and diminish the effectiveness of such markets in channelling scarce 
capital. Moreover, in markets in which the null hypothesis of no herding is rejected, the 
volatility exhibited is likely to be higher than if agents did not herd because herding leads to a 
greater concentration of agents on one side of the market. The mimicry of small traders would 
either add momentum to price changes in these markets, or cause prices to overshoot the price 
that would be determined in the absence of herding. Fluctuations in prices are, therefore, 
likely to be magnified by herding, resulting in more volatile and less informative prices. 
Participants in international trade and investment would be exposed to greater foreign 
exchange risk, and exchange rate movements would be rendered less informative by the 
greater volatility arising from the herding behaviour of small traders. 
The results of this paper contribute to the debate on the desirability of the existence of noise 
traders in financial markets. Noise traders perform the critical function of providing liquidity 
to markets and enabling informed traders to transact, by which information is impounded into 
financial market prices. A perverse result of the homogeneous agent perfect information 
trading models is that no trading occurs because agents have identical expectations, and hence 
have no reason to trade. As noise traders facilitate the smooth operation of financial markets, 
it is difficult to argue that noise trading should be limited by measures such as transaction 
taxes, or if society would benefit from the limitation of noise trading. Schwert and Seguin 
(1993) state that the effect on market volatility of limiting noise trading is ambiguous. While 
herding noise traders may exacerbate price changes, lower market liquidity may result in 
more rapid price changes as it implies that a market is less able to absorb large trades. 
Furthermore, prices may become less informative, thereby resulting in financial markets that 
are less effective in allocating scare capital. 
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